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INTRODUCTION*
In this first issue of Volume 60, The Survey examines a vari-
* The following abbreviations will be used uniformly throughout The Survey:
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (McKinney) ............................ CPLR
New York Civil Practice Act ................................................... CPA
New York Criminal Procedure Law (McKinney) ................................. CPL
New York Code of Criminal Procedure ......................................... CCP
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (McKinney) ...................... RPAPL
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The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice .................... The Quarterly Survey
The Survey of New York Practice ........................................ The Survey
The Extremely valuable in understanding the CPLR are the five reports of the Advi-
sory Committee on Practice and Procedure. They are contained in the following legislative
documents and will be cited as follows:
1957 N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 6(b) ................................. FiRST REP.
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ety of issues of recent importance in New York law. Among the
cases considered is Moustakas v. Bouloukos in which the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that an attorney of record may
not be dismissed unless the statutory procedures of CPLR 321 are
followed. In Moustakas the plaintiff had discharged his attorney
be means of a handwritten letter rather than in the manner pre-
scribed by CPLR 321. In a memorandum opinion, the court
deemed such a dismissal ineffective and permitted a recission of
the settlement that was negotiated by the plaintiff per se.
In Brandon v. Chefetz, the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, broadly construed Article 9 of the CPLR, holding that Arti-
cle 9 could not be used to bar certification of plaintiff shareholders
with substantially similar claims in actions against corporate direc-
tors. The Brandon court advocated a broad construction of Article
9 to ensure that injured parties would not be precluded from ad-
vancing their claims.
In this issue, The Survey also examines People v. Lawrence, in
which the Court of Appeals refused to excuse a defendant's failure
to make a timely motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds even
though the failure to make such a motion resulted from the trial
judge's directive to defer the motion until after trial. The majority
held that CPL section 255.20(3), which grants discretionary au-
thority to courts to consider pre-trial motions any time prior to
sentencing, does not apply to motions to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds. Therefore, the defendant's failure to comply with the
statutory procedures of CPL section 210.20(2) constituted a waiver
of defendant's right to request a dismissal on speedy trial grounds.
The dissent criticized the narrow construction of section 210.20(2)
by the majority, arguing that section 255.20(3) is applicable to all
pre-trial motions.
Finally, The Survey examines a recent clarification in the law
concerning eavesdropping warrants. In People v. Paluska, the Ap-
pellate Division, Third Department, considered sections of the
1958 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 13 ................................. SECOND REP.
1959 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17 ................................. THRD REP.
1960 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 120 ................................ FOURTH REP.
1961 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure ................. ....................... .FINAL REP.
Also valuable are the two joint reports of the Senate Finance and Assembly Ways and
Means Committee:
1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15 ............ ................ FIFTH REP.
1962 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 8 .................................. .SIxTH REP.
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CPL that authorize the issuance of eavesdropping warrants for a
period of interception no longer than thirty days. Stressing the im-
portance of strictly construing eavesdropping statutes, the court
held that the thirty days begins to run on the day the warrant is
issued unless the issuing court specifies another date of commence-
ment in the warrant. The members of Volume 60 hope that the
cases considered in The Survey will be of help and interest to the
New York bench and bar.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 321: Remedy of rescission available to party who violates
statute by negotiating settlement pro se without effectively dis-
charging an attorney of record
CPLR 3211 provides that a party to a civil action who appears2
by counsel is prohibited from acting for himself in the action ex-
cept by permission of the court.3 Further, if a party wishes to ap-
See CPLR 321 (Supp. 1986). Section 321(a) of the CPLR provides:
(a) A party, other than one specified in section 1201, may prosecute or defend a
civil action in person or by attorney, except that a corporation... shall appear
by attorney, except as otherwise provided in section 1809 of the New York city
civil court act, the uniform district court act, the uniform city court act and the
uniform justice court act. If a party appears by attorney he may not act in person
in the action except by consent of the court.
Id.; WK&M T 321.01 (1985).
Courts generally have stated that the purpose of § 321 is to avoid confusion regarding
the identity of the individual who has authority to act in an ongoing litigation. See infra
note 28 and accompanying text.
Section 321(a) of the CPLR was adopted substantially unchanged from CPA 236. See
FOURTH REP. 190; FINAL REP. 281; SIXTH REP. 119; CPLR 321, commentary at 411 (1972).
Several older cases construing CPA 236 are treated in this survey to aid in an analysis of the
corresponding CPLR section.
2 See CPLR 320(a). A formal appearance is made when a party either "serve[s] an
answer or a notice of appearance," or "mak[es] a motion which has the effect of extending
the time to answer." Id.
3 See CPLR 321(a); H. WACHTELL, NEW YORK PRACTICE UNDER THE CPLR 66-67 (5th
ed. 1976); accord Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 19, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 117
(2d Dep't 1978) (although party represented by counsel at trial may not act, he may help
plan trial strategy). Compare Chase Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. O'Flynn, N.Y.L.J., June 22,
1984, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 21, 1984) (despite contention that such was
delay tactic, defendant who properly discharged his attorney could act on his own behalf)
with Cann v. Cann, 204 Misc. 1069, 1071, 127 N.Y.S.2d 55, 58 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954)
(once defendant represented by counsel, counsel can be served on defendant's behalf).
The rule against pro se representation by a party represented by counsel predates the
codification of civil procedure in New York. See Webb v. Dill, 18 Abb. Pr. 264, 264 (Sup. Ct.
1st Dist. 1865). This principle is closely related to the premise permitting a party to retain
only one attorney of record in a particular action. Cf. Dobbins v. County of Erie, 58 App.
1985]
